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4. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO HEAR THIS MATTER:
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code, Section 78-2-2, and authority to assign
this case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code, Section
78-2-2(4).

This Court received this case by transfer from the

Supreme Court on November 28, 1994, and has jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code Section 78-2a-3(2)(j).
5.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL:
The issues raised in this appeal are as follows:
A.

Whether the lower court erred by allowing Defendant to

conduct discovery after it had cut off all discovery by its prior
orders?
The standard of review on this issue is: The Appellate
Court reviews the decision for its correctness, and not based
upon an abuse of discretion.

The Appellate Court determines for

itself the proper outcome based on the applicable Rule and does
not defer in any degree to the trial judge7s determination of
law.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), citing State

v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993), and Kennecott Corp. v.
State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993).
B.

Whether Appellant is allowed an additional three (3)

days to file its answers to discovery requests pursuant to Rule 6
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and, therefore, its answers
on April 25, 1994, were timely?
The standard of review on this issue is: The Appellate
1

Court reviews the decision for its correctness, and not based
upon an abuse of discretion.

The Appellate Court determines for

itself the proper outcome based on the applicable Rule and does
not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of
law.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), citing State

v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993), and Kennecott Corp. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993).
C.

Whether Appellant is allowed an additional five (5) days

to file an answer pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-504 of the
Code of Judicial Administration and therefore his answers of
April 25, 1994, were timely?
The standard of review on this issue is: The Appellate
Court reviews the decision for its correctness, and not based
upon an abuse of discretion.

The Appellate Court determines for

itself the proper outcome based on the applicable Rule and does
not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of
law.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), citing State

v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993), and Kennecott Corp. v.
State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993).
D.

Should Appellant be relieved from any obligation to file

answers to the April 12, 1994 Order because it was not served
upon Appellant?
The standard of review on this issue is: The Appellate
Court reviews the decision for its correctness, and not based
upon an abuse of discretion.

The Appellate Court determines for

itself the proper outcome based on the applicable Rule and does
2

not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of
law.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), citing State

v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993), and Kennecott Corp. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993).
E.

Assuming, arguendo, all of the actions of the lower

Court were proper in entering an order of dismissal under the
relevant rules, should Appellant be relieved of the onerous
sanction of dismissal when he was unaware of the order requiring
an earlier delivery and his answers to discovery were delivered
one business day late?
The standard of review on this issue is: The lower Court's
decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Katz v. Pierce,

732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986), Bovce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah
1980), Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976).
F.

Whether, under the circumstances, Defendant should be

entitled to any sanctions, including the award of $250.00 in
attorney's fees?
The standard of review on this issue is: The lower Court's
decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Katz v. Pierce,

732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986), Boyce v. Bovce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah
1980), Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976).
6.

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS APPEAL:
The Rules applicable to this appeal are as follows:
Rule 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Additional time for service by mail. Whenever a party has
the right or is required to do some act or take some
proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of
a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is
3

served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the
prescribed period, (Emphasis added.)
Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration:
Copies of the proposed findings, judgements, and orders
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented
to the court for signature unless the court otherwise
orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the
court and counsel within five days after service. (Emphasis
added.)
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration:
[Copy of this rule is contained in an addendum in this brief
pursuant to Rule 24(f) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure]
Rule 26(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Discovery conference. At any time after commencement of an
action, the court may direct the attorneys for the parties
to appear before it in a conference on the subject of
discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by the
attorney for any party if the motion includes:
(1) a statement of the issues as they then appear;
(2) a proposed plan and schedule for discovery;
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery;
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery;
and
(5) a statement showing that the attorney making the motion
has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with
opposing attorneys on the matters set forth in the motion.
Each party and his attorney are under a duty to participate
in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan if a plan
is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice of the
motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or
additions to matters set forth in the motion shall be served
not later than ten days after service of the motion.
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an
order tentatively identifying the issues for discovery
purposes, establishing a plan and schedule for discovery,
setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determining
such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as
are necessary for the proper management of discovery in the
action. An order may be altered or amended whenever justice
so requires.
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a
discovery conference with a prompt convening of the
conference, the court may combine the discovery conference
with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 6. (Emphasis
added.)

4

7.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
This is an appeal from an Order Dismissing with prejudice a

personal injury law suit brought by Appellant in the Fourth
District Court for the State of Utah based upon the Appellant's
alleged failure to comply with a discovery order.

(See Order of

Dismissal dated April 28, 1994, in the Record at Page 229.)

In

the brief of Appellant, the Record shall be referred to as
follows: "R. at p.—".)

The facts relevant to this proceeding

are as follows:
FACTS
1.

Appellant, William Morton, is a 56-year-old male truck

driver who was permanently and totally disabled by a vehicle
accident which occurred on April 29, 1989.
p. 3 - 1.)

(See Complaint, R. at

Appellant is commonly referred to as "Woody" Morton.

He timely filed suit and prosecuted the action in the District
Court, among other things, hired experts who were deposed by the
Defendant.

The parties both cooperated in discovery while the

case was pending in the Fourth District Court and there was only
one motion filed by either party which dealt with discovery. (R.
at p. 137.)
2.

That single motion was filed after the case had been

pending for more than three (3) years with numerous depositions,
interrogatories, and documents having been produced. (See court
file referencing Depositions of William Morton (See R. at p.
20.), Rudolph Limpert (See R. at p. 31 and 36.), Donald Remington
(See R. at p. 25, 29 and 34.), Dr. Philip Hoyt (See R. at p. 66
5

and 80.)/ Newell Knight (See R. at p. 45 and 56.), Greg Duval
(See R. at p. 80 and 82.), and Steven Pelton (R. at p. 23 and
27) .
3.

The Fourth District Court entered a "Minute

Entry/Pretrial Conference Trial Setting" on May 8, 1992, which
ordered that discovery be completed by October 30, 1992.
Minute Entry, R. at p. 32.)

(See

Subsequently, at the request of both

parties, the trial was continued until January 11, 1994. A
scheduling order was entered in May of 1993 which established a
discovery cut-off date of December 8, 1993.

(See Scheduling

Order, R. at p. 73.)
4.

In accordance with this schedule, Appellant Woody

Morton and Defendant each prepared and submitted witness and
exhibit lists, jointly signed and submitted a pretrial order, and
exchanged trial exhibits in December of 1993.

(See Pretrial

Order, R. at p. 120 - 110.)
5.

Just before the trial was scheduled to commence in

January of 1994, Defendant requested the trial be continued and
Appellant Woody Morton did not oppose the request.

Although the

trial was continued, discovery had been cut off on December 8,
1993 by order of the Fourth District Court.

No scheduling order

was entered, nor any other order entered which allowed Defendant
to continue taking discovery.

(See Minute Entry, R. at p. 107.)

A day later, the District Court signed a Pretrial Order.

This

Order had signatures from Appellants counsel and Defendant's
counsel.

This Order, submitted to the court and entered January
6

11, 1994, stated: "Discovery has been completed."

(R. at p.

110.)
6.

Although discovery was not permitted, Defendant

propounded interrogatories and request for production of
documents on January 14, 1994. While Appellant Woody Morton was
under no obligation to do so, he undertook to answer the
discovery requests by again interviewing witnesses listed on both
Appellant's and Defendant's witness lists in the Pretrial Order.
(See Certificate of Service, R. at p. 133; Request for Production
of Documents, R. at p. 1 4 2 - 1 4 0 ; and Interrogatories, R. at p.
156 - 143.)
7.

In addition to the witnesses previously identified as

witnesses for both parties, Appellant was also able to interview
a witness named Marvin Ainge.

Although Mr. Ainge was identified

in discovery as a potential witness, he had never been located
for an interview.

Mr. Ainge was a truck driver who arrived at

the scene of the accident immediately after it occurred in April
of 1989.

He is a truck driver whose vocation regularly takes him

outside Utah.
8.

(R. at p. 433.)

Mr. Ainge was unavailable to meet and be interviewed

until Saturday April 9, 1994. He was recorded at Woody Morton's
counsel's office on that Saturday, and the transcript was
prepared of that interview Thursday April 14, 1994 and mailed to
him for his review, approval, and signing on April 15, 1994. Mr.
Ainge returned the signed statement on May 6, 1994.
433 and 474.)
7

(R. at p.

9.

Defendant filed a Motion to Compel answers to discovery

requests,

(See R. at p. 137.)

On April 12, 1994 the Fourth

District Court contacted counsel for Defendant ex parte

and

requested Defendant prepare an order which gave Appellant Woody
Morton ten (10) days to answer the discovery requests and which
threatened to dismiss the Appellant's complaint unless the
answers were produced within ten (10) days.
admits the ex parte
August 29, 1994.

The lower Judge

communication in his Memorandum Decision of
(See Order, R. at p. 164; Memorandum, R. at p.

376; and Memorandum Decision, paragraph 6, R. at p. 483.)

When

the lower Court called Defendant's counsel, Woody Morton's
counsel was not included, and therefore did not know of the
conversation or of the Order to be entered pursuant to the
conversation.
10.

Defendant prepared such an order the same day, April

12, 1994, and hand carried it to the Judge of the Fourth District
Court on that same day.

Also on the same day the District Court

Judge signed the Order and the clerk entered the Order.

(See

Order, R. at 164; and Memorandum, R. at p.376.)
11.

Defendant alleges it "mailed" a copy of the Order to

Appellant on that same date. Appellant has no record of
receiving such an order.

(See Affidavits of Denver C. Snuffer,

Jr., R. at p. 388 - 386; and Brenda Welch, R. at p. 385 - 382 and
490 - 488.)
12.

The legal secretary responsible for opening mail and

routing it to counsel as well as Woody Morton's counsel submitted
8

affidavits to the Court below attesting the Order was not
received.
13.

(Id.)
Without knowing an order was entered compelling answers

to be produced, Appellant finalized its answers to the discovery
requests on approximately April 18, 1994. However, Woody Morton
was in the hospital because of an emergency appendectomy at the
time the answers were finalized and was unavailable to sign the
answers.
14.

(Id.)
Woody Morton was available to sign the answers on April

21, 1994. However, since he was unaware of any order requiring
the answers to be delivered, his answers were not delivered until
Monday, April 25, 1994.
15.

(Id.)

Defendant filed a motion on April 25, 1994, asking for

dismissal of Woody Morton's complaint with prejudice.

No reply

to the motion was permitted (cf. with CJA Rule 4-501(1)(b)) and a
dismissal was entered three (3) days later based on the motion.
(R. at p. 215, 229.) Although Defendant alleges it had "mailed"
a copy of the April 12, Order on April 12, 1994, and although
Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows three (3) days
to Appellant because of mailing, Defendant nonetheless insisted
the answers came due on Friday, April 22, 1994, and they were
delinquent when received on Monday, April 25, 1994. (See R. at p.
376 - 374.)

If three days are added, the answers were due the

day they were received.

The Motion asking for dismissal of

Appellant's complaint does not mention answers had been received.
16.

The Court and counsel for Defendant ignored the
9

requirements of Rule 4-504 (2), which allowed five days after the
submission of a proposed form of order for Appellant to object
before its entry.

Under the provisions of either Rule 6 of the

Utah Civil Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 4-504 of the Code of
Judicial Administration, the answers filed by Appellant Woody
Morton on Monday April 25, 1994 were timely.
17.

Defendant alleges it delivered a copy of its April 25th

Motion to Enter an Order of Dismissal to Appellant.
has no record of ever receiving such a motion.

Appellant

Again, affidavits

from a legal secretary and counsel attested to this. (See R. at
p. 388 - 382 and 490 - 488.)
18.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 4-501 of the

Code of Judicial Administration, which allows Appellant ten (10)
days after service of a motion to file an opposition memorandum,
the Court entered an Order of Dismissal on April 28, 1994, three
(3) days after the motion was filed.
19.

(See R. at p. 229.)

On May 9, 1994, Appellant, for the first time, was

notified of the Orders of April 12th and 28th.

(See R. at p.

247.)
20.

Appellant immediately filed a series of motions seeking

relief including a Motion for Relief from Judgment (See R. at p.
249 - 233.), Motion to Set Aside Judgment (See R. at p. 405 400.), Motion to Strike Order of April 12 (See R. at p. 449 452.), and Motion to Strike Order of April 28, 1994. (See R. at
p. 447 - 442.) On June 14th, the Court below extended time to
appeal this matter until 30 days following its ruling on these
10

motions pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. (See R. at p. 407.)
21.

On September 22, 1994 the Court denied all of

Appellant's motions.

The Court also sanctioned Appellant with

attorneys' fees to Defendant of $250.00.

The Court mentioned,

for the first time, retroactively, that Defendant was given more
"time" for discovery by the continuance in January.
484.)

(R. at p.

This matter then became final and appealable, and

Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal. (See R. at p. 498,
496.)
8. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:
A.

The lower Court erred by allowing Defendant to conduct

discovery after it had Ordered an end to discovery.
Order cut off discovery in December 1993.

A Scheduling

The Minute Entry

continuing the case on January 10, 1994 does not reopen
discovery.

The Pretrial Order signed by the Court and

Defendant's counsel on January 11, 1994 states "Discovery has
been concluded."

It was an error to enter a Dismissal of the

case based on failure to answer discovery when discovery was no
longer permitted.
B.

Defendant alleges it "mailed" notice of an Order

requiring answers within 10 days. Assuming the notice was
actually mailed (Appellant has no record of it ever being
received), Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows an
additional three (3) days for answers.
allow these additional days.

The lower Court did not

If they had, the answers of Woody
11

Morton were timely.

It was an error to not allow this additional

time.
C.

Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration

required Defendant to submit its Order to Appellant for review
before submitting it to the Court.

Appellant had five (5) days

to review and approve the proposed order.

Although the order was

not submitted to Appellant, the five days allowed for objection
should be added to the time for his answer under the Order.

If

the five days are added, his answers were early and it was an
error to dismiss the case.
D.

Appellant has no record of receiving the Order of April

12, 1994. The Defendant alleges it "mailed" a copy of the Order.
In three affidavits below, Appellant testified he was unaware of
the Order.

Under these circumstances, an answer that is only one

business day late should be excused.
E.

Assuming all actions of the lower Court were

procedurally correct, equity and fairness require a reversal of
the dismissal of the case.

This was the only motion dealing with

discovery filed by either party below.
the answers were one business day late.

Under Defendant's theory,
The dismissal was too

harsh a remedy to impose. Answers were merely a courtesy, since
discovery was not permitted by prior Order of the Court, and
therefore dismissal for failure to participate in prohibited
discovery is a manifest unjust result.
F.

Under the circumstances of this case, no sanctions were

proper.

The award of attorney's fees was also inappropriate and
12

should be reversed.
9. ARGUMENT OF APPELLANT IN SUPPORT OF THIS APPEAL:
BACKGROUND
The lower court seemed to fault Appellant for the length of
time this case had been pending below.

However, Woody Morton had

diligently prosecuted the case for over three years.
Initially, he was undergoing repeated major surgeries to
correct injuries from the accident involved in this case.

In one

instance trial was continued to allow Woody to undergo another
knee replacement surgery. (R. at p. 59, 63.)

It was also

continued once by the Court below due to its scheduling.

The

final continuance was at the request of Defendant.
Prior to the case being filed, the insurance company, on
behalf of Defendant, Continental Baking Company, had an
investigating adjuster.

Continental Baking Company, its

insurance adjuster, counsel for Defendant, as well as Woody
Mortons counsel, exchanged, voluntarily and cooperatively, all
of the physical evidence in this case.

Most of the exchange of

evidence took place before the lawsuit was filed.
The physical evidence consisted primarily of a series of
photographs taken at the scene of the accident by the Utah
Department of Transportation.

There was a video tape made of

scene of the accident by the Utah Department of Transportation.
Although the Utah Highway Patrol took some photographs of the
scene, their photographs were not or could not be developed and
were therefore unavailable to either party.
13

The investigating

officer at the accident scene prepared field notes and a report
on the accident.

Prior to the lawsuit being filed both parties

had all the Department of Transportations photographs, the
police investigation report, field notes of the investigating
officer, and the video made by the Department of Transportation.
After the law suit was filed the investigating police
officer was deposed.

Defendant hired an expert accident

reconstructionist named Rudolph Limpert.
taken.

His deposition was

Appellant hired an accident investigation expert named

Don Remington, whose deposition was taken.

Mr. Morton also

retained an expert due to a dispute over the location of a fuel
spill shown in the photographs.

This expert was Dr. Philip Hoyt.

Dr. Hoyt is a neighbor of the Defense attorney, and is acquainted
with Defendant's counsel personally and socially.
deposed.

Dr. Hoyt was

Mr. Morton also hired Greg Duval as an accident

reconstructionist.

He was interviewed and recorded by Defendant.

Before the lawsuit was filed, Woody Morton was interviewed
by the insurance adjuster for Continental Baking Company and the
interview was recorded.

After the lawsuit, Mr. Morton was

deposed and the recorded statement taken by the adjuster was made
an exhibit to his deposition.
Over the course of several days of final trial preparation,
Dr. Hoyt noticed skid marks in the photographs and video tapes in
close proximity to the accident which he believed had a bearing
on the reconstruction of the accident.

The police officer

testified in his deposition these skid marks were unrelated to
14

the accident.

After carefully reviewing the photographs and

video tape for several hours Dr. Hoyt had the conviction that
skid-marks appearing in the photographs and video tape had to
originate from Woody Morton's vehicle.

When he reached this

conclusion, Appellant's counsel telephoned Defendant's counsel on
a speaker phone.

Defense counsel was allowed to interview Dr.

Hoyt regarding what he saw in the photographs and his view of the
way in which the accident unfolded.

There were no new

photographs or video tapes being used.

This was the same video

tape which both parties had in their possession prior to and
throughout the time the lawsuit had been pending.

Defense

counsel recognized the information in the photographs to which
Dr. Hoyt made reference.
Because Defendant's counsel believed he needed more time to
prepare as a result of this new theory, he asked for a
continuance of the trial.

Appellant did not object.

The

primary purpose of the continuance, as Appellant's counsel
understood it, was to give Defendant time to prepare for the
additional theory.

Defendant was to review the new theory with

his own accident reconstructionist.

For this, no discovery was

needed and the requests propounded by Defendant were superfluous.
Dr. Hoyt's theory of the skid-marks was his opinion based
upon photographs and video tapes.

The theory would be greatly

strengthened if the truck driver who arrived first at the scene
from the same direction Woody Morton was traveling could be
contacted and interviewed.

Although the parties knew this
15

individual's name, Marvin Ainge, he had not been interviewed by
Appellant.

Mr. Ainge was previously identified in discovery as a

potential witness.
and interviewed.

He could have been contacted by either party

In checking Appellant's files, letters had been

sent to Mr. Ainge and efforts had been made to interview him for
several years without success. After the continuance, in an
effort to bolster the opinion of Dr. Hoyt, Appellant renewed his
effort to contact Mr. Ainge.
Mr. Ainge was a truck driver who was out of the State of
Utah regularly with his employment.

Although renewed efforts to

contact him began in January, he was unavailable until Saturday,
April 9, 1994, for Appellant to interview.

Appellant does not

know if Mr. Ainge was interviewed by Defendant before or since
then.

He was certainly as available to Defendant to interview as

he was to Appellant.

In fact, given Defendant's resources and

the resources of its insurance company, it was in a better
position to investigate and locate witnesses than Woody Morton.
Defendant's insurance carrier had aggressively investigated the
accident.

They had even interviewed Woody Morton while he was in

a hospital bed eight (8) days after the accident.

Mr. Ainge was,

in any case, not a surprise witness.
Appellant received discovery requests from Defendant in
January of 1994. This was after discovery had been cut off by a
prior Scheduling Order and by the Pretrial Order.

Appellant did

not object to answering the untimely discovery requests, but an
objection is not required to untimely discovery.
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As a matter of

courtesy, Woody intended to answer the discovery.

The quality of

the information requested in the untimely discovery would be
greatly improved if Mr. Ainge could be interviewed before the
answers were supplied.

Therefore, Appellant's counsel

concentrated his efforts on getting Mr. Ainge interviewed and
providing input from Mr. Ainge in the answers.
When Mr. Ainge was interviewed April 9, 1994, he was able to
tell from the photographic evidence and video tape the skid-marks
in close proximity to the accident were not created by his
vehicle.

Mr. Ainge consented to make a statement, which he

allowed to be recorded as part of the interview.

He was tape

recorded as part of the interview.
A written transcript of Mr. Ainge's interview was completed
on Thursday, April 14, 1994, and mailed to Mr. Ainge for his
review, approval, and signing on April 15, 1994. He did not
return the signed statement until May 6, 1994. However, the
information he made available was incorporated into the Woody's
answers to discovery, and those answers were completed on April
18, 1994.
Woody Morton was contacted by his counsel and asked to sign
the answers to discovery on approximately April 18th. However,
Woody was hospitalized for an emergency appendectomy and was
unavailable to sign until his release from the hospital.

He

signed the answers on April 21, 1994. Appellant was unaware of
any court imposed deadline and unaware answers were due at any
set time.

In spite of the fact Appellant was unaware of any
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deadline, answers were received by Defendant on Monday, April 25,
1994.
All of the proceedings below were based solely upon the
failure to provide the answers on Friday, April 22, 1994. Those
answers could have been mailed on Friday and would not have
arrived until Monday the 25th or thereafter, and still have been
timely under Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The case was scheduled for trial in August, 1994. Answers
delivered on Friday, April 22, or on Monday, April 25, would not
in any way prejudice Defendant's preparation for trial in August.
Further, the information about the new theory had been discussed
fully by defense counsel with the witness testifying to the
theory in a phone conference before the continuance was granted.
Defendant was fully able to prepare its own expert witness with
the information already provided prior to the continuance.

To

the extent Defendant wanted to interview Mr. Ainge, they had his
name and the resources to contact him.

The Defendant did not

need more time for Woody Morton to interview known witnesses and
report findings to them.
A. The District Court erred by Allowing Defendant to Conduct
Discovery After it had Cut Off Discovery by its Prior Orders,
The District Court erred by allowing Defendant to conduct
discovery after it had cut off discovery by its prior Scheduling
Order.

Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the

District Court to enter a discovery order "establishing a plan
and schedule for discovery..."

The court cannot enter such an
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order and then disregard it.

Until the continuance of the trial

in January, 1994, there had always been compliance with the
Court's Scheduling Orders by the Court and the parties.

There

was a violation of that Order when Defendant propounded discovery
requests on January 14, 1994.

Defendant should not be entitled

to ignore the Scheduling Order and then receive a dismissal
against Woody Morton on the basis of Defendant's violation of
that Order.

If Defendant wanted further discovery, it should

have asked to reopen discovery.
There was no order reopening discovery.

The Minute Entry of

January 10, 1994 which continued the case makes no reference to
reopening discovery.

(R. at p. 107)

This is the document of the

Court entered contemporaneous with the continuance.
the Court signed a Pretrial Order.

A day later,

This Order also has the

signatures of Defendant's attorney and Mr. Morton's attorney.
This Pretrial Order states: "Discovery has been completed."

(R.

at p. 110)
In contrast to the Orders at the time of the continuance,
months later the lower Court wrote it "reset the trial in order
to give the Defendant time for discovery."
See, Memorandum Decision, R. at p. 484)

(Emphasis Added.

This does not mean,

however, Defendant did not need to move to reopen discovery.

It

does not follow that granting more time has the automatic effect
of entering an order allowing discovery.

The lower Court had

previously always followed a practice of entering an Order
outlining the discovery cutoff.

(See, eg. Minute Entry, R. at p.
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32; Scheduling Order, R. at p. 73.)

In contrast to the Rules and

established past practice, there is only passing mention,
retroactively, in the final Memorandum Decision, that the Court
wanted to give Defendant more "time" for discovery.

Due Process

requires notice in advance.
If it was the Courts actual intent to reopen discovery, it
should have followed the Rules and its prior practice.

Reopening

of discovery is not mentioned in the Minute Entry of January
10th.

Discovery is prohibited by the Pretrial Order of January

11th.

This Pretrial Order could easily have been interlineated

or amended by the Court if it really entertained the intent to
reopen discovery.

The Court had the responsibility to give Mr.

Morton notice of that before the discovery was propounded, rather
than telling him about it months after the fact.

If it were

actually the intent of the lower Court to reopen discovery, it
could have been a great deal more clear on the matter.

As the

record stands, Defendant was not entitled to any further
discovery.

The answers given by Woody Morton were only a

courtesy.

His failure to tender the courtesy earlier is no

reason to dismiss his case.
B.

Appellant was Allowed an Additional Three (3) Days to

Answer under Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
Therefore, the April 25, 1994 Answers were Timely.
Assuming there was nothing improper about the
discovery, Appellant is allowed an additional three (3) days to
file his answers to discovery requests pursuant to Rule 6 of the
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
25, 1994, were timely.

Therefore, his answers on April

Defendant alleges it "mailed" to

Appellant a copy of the Order.

Therefore, under Defendant's

version of the events, by mailing the notice to Appellant, Rule 6
added three days to the time requirements imposed by the Order.
Once three days are added, the answers were not due until Monday,
April 25, 1993. They were actually received at that time.
There was a manifest error by the lower Court when it failed
to allow Mr. Morton these additional three days when computing
whether he complied with the Court's Order.

The Order of

Dismissal should, therefore, be reversed.
It should be noted that if they had been mailed on Friday,
and received on Monday they would have been timely even under
Defendant's version of the facts and law.

They were admittedly

delivered on Monday.
C.

Appellant is Allowed an Additional Five (5) Days to

Object Before the Entry of an Order Under Rule 4-504 of the Code
of Judicial Administration, and Therefore the April 25* 1994
Answers were Timely,
Woody Morton should be allowed an additional five (5)
days to file an answer under the April 12th Order pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration.
Therefore, his answers of April 25, 1994, were timely.
parte

The ex

communications between the court and Defendant's counsel

which resulted in the April 12th order violated Rule 4-504. Mr.
Morton should have been given five (5) days to object to the
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proposed form of order before it was signed by the court.

If

this additional five day period is added to the time of the
Order, the April 25th answers were two days early.

For this

reason, the lower Court should be reversed.
D.

Should Appellant be Relieved from any Responsibility to

File Answers on April 22, 1994, Because the Order Requiring
Answers on that Date was not Served Upon Him,
Appellant should be relieved from any obligation to
file answers to the April 12, 1994, Order because the Order was
not served upon him.
the Order.

Appellant has no record of ever receiving

Woody Morton filed answers as a courtesy on April

25th without knowing they were due.

Assuming he is not entitled

to any additional time under the Order based on Rule 6 URCP or
Rule 4-504, because he never received the Order of April 12th, he
should be relieved from failing to comply with the Order.

In any

event, Mr. Morton missed compliance by at most only one business
day of an Order kept secret from him.

Under these circumstances,

the lower Court should be reversed.
Below, controlling weight was given to Certificates of
Mailing and Delivery signed by Defendant.

These Certificates

alone were used to determine if Appellant received the documents
in question, rather than a sworn affidavit of Woody Morton's
counsel, and another two affidavits from a legal secretary who
reviewed and calendared all incoming documents.
Counsel for the Defendant is not above errors in mailing.
In one instance, Defendants counsel mailed two copies of an
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affidavit from one affiant, and failed to mail a copy of another
affidavit from a different affiant.

These were attached to

motions made after the mailing certificates were drawn into
question.

(R. at p. 430.) Everyone makes a mistake on occasion.

Here, the lower Court chose to deprive Woody Morton the
opportunity to present the merits of his case based upon the
presumed infallibility of the Defendant's mailing system and the
U.S. Mail.

That, too, while giving no weight to affidavits from

an attorney and legal secretary who never received the documents.
Appellant has no history of ignoring any court order.

Mr.

Morton would not have ignored the April 12th Order if it had been
received.

The answers were ready on Thursday.

He would not have

delivered the answers on Monday if he knew they were due on
Friday.

He was not aware of the Order, and for that reason alone

did not meet the deadline.

He should be relieved from the harsh

consequences imposed by the lower Court.

No litigant should lose

his opportunity for a day in court because a document was not
received by his counsel.
It should be remembered the failure here is one within the
control of the party benefiting from the failure.
failed to get a copy to Appellant.

The Defendant

The Defendant did not call

Appellant's counsel on the phone to alert him of the Order,
although there was a good working relationship.

That remains the

greatest mystery to Appellant still. Appellant's counsel would
not have sought a dismissal under the circumstances without first
talking with the Defense attorney to confirm there was an
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intentional abandonment of the case.

Here, Defendant benefits

from a dismissal on a technicality of procedure.

None of the

dispositive events were within the control of the Appellant or
his counsel.

Mr. Morton is the one burdened by the dismissal.

It is fundamentally unfair to allow such inequities to remain.
It is also curious the Court and Defendant's counsel talked
about the April 12th Order ex parte
same day as the conversation.

and entered the Order the

If Appellant's counsel had been

included in that conversation, there would be no question
Appellant would have learned of the Order.

Once again, Woody

Morton lost substantive legal rights below which could have
easily been protected by the Court with little additional effort.
This cries out for correction on appeal.
E.

Assuming the Lower Court Complied with all Procedural

Requirements, the Order of Dismissal was Still Improper Because
Appellant was Unaware of His Violation of any Order, and the
Sanction of Dismissal is Too Harsh Under the Circumstances Here,
Assuming, arguendo,

all of the actions of the lower

Court were proper in entering an order of dismissal under the
relevant Rules of Procedure, Woody Morton should be relieved of
the onerous sanction of dismissal.

He was unaware of the order

requiring an earlier delivery and his answers were delivered at
the most one business day late. As the Appeals court stated in
Parr inert on v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (1991): "...default judgment is
an unusually harsh sanction that should be meted out with
caution." Id. at 456.

The Supreme Court also looked at the
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sanctions allowed under Rule 37 shortly after its revision in
1972.

The court explained sanctions by a lower court must fit

within fundamental concern for fairness and meeting the ends of
justice.

The Court wrote:
"It is true that where the authority to perform a
proposed action rests within the discretion of the
court we must allow considerable latitude in which he
may exercise his judgment. But this does not mean that
the court has unrestrained power to act in an arbitrary
manner. Fundamental to the concept of the rule of law
is the principle that reason and justice shall prevail
over the arbitrary and uncontrolled will of any one
person; and that this applies to all men in every
status: to courts and judges, as well as to autocrats
or bureaucrats. The meaning of the term "discretion"
itself imports that the action should be taken within
reason and good conscience in the interest of
protecting the rights of both parties and serving the
ends of justice. It has always been the policy of our
law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to
have their day in court of the merits of a
controversy." Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603
(1976).

The result here is fundamentally unfair.

The parties have

not had their day in court to resolve the matter on its merits.
Reason and good conscience require the court below be reversed
and this matter remanded for decision on its merits.
This matter is now before the Appeals Court based solely on
Defendant's allegation it delivered documents which Appellant has
no record of receiving.

Mr. Morton has verified the documents

were not in his files by multiple affidavits.

Even so, the

answers were at the most one business day late under the
Defendant's theory. Defendant's theory is also dependent upon
ignoring various Rules of Civil Procedure and Judicial
Administration.

It requires the Court to believe Woody Morton,
25

after spending over 3 years of time and over $20,000.00 in costs
prosecuting this case would violate an order by one day when he
could have complied.

This proposition makes no sense.

Order had been given to him, he would have complied.

If the

It made no

difference to Mr. Morton whether he delivered the signed answers
on Thursday, the 21st of April, when signed, Friday, the 22nd, or
on Monday, the 25th of April.

Since the alleged deadline was

Friday, with the potential for violation of an Order if it was
not met, Mr. Morton would surely have complied if the Order had
been given to him.

The harsh result below is too inequitable to

let stand.
F.

No Sanctions, Including Attorney's Fees, were Proper in

This Case.
Appellant will not reiterate the matters compelling relief
again here.

It is apparent, however, under the circumstances,

Defendant should not be entitled to any sanctions including the
award of $250.00 in attorneys' fees.
10. CONCLUSION:
Woody Morton was not required to answer discovery after
December 1993. The discovery of January, 1994 was in violation
of the Court's Scheduling Order and Pretrial Order.

The Minute

Entry continuing the case makes no mention of allowing further
discovery.

No dismissal should be based on a failure to answer

inappropriate discovery.
The answers on Monday, April 25th, were on time.

Rule 6 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow an extra three days to
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any deadline for mailing.

Here, Defendant alleges he "mailed" a

copy of the Order to Appellant.

Once notice is served by mail,

an additional three days is allowed by this rule.
Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration allows
five days for a party to review any order for approval before it
is submitted to the Court for signing.

That was not done.

However, Mr. Morton should be given five additional days under
this rule in computing whether the answers were due on Friday,
April 22nd.

When this additional time is taken into account, the

answers were two days early when Defendant received them on
Monday, April 25th.
This situation is fraught with potentially disastrous
consequences for litigators.

If any plaintiff can lose her right

to have her case decided on the merits by unknowingly missing a
deadline by one day, justice will become an increasingly elusive
goal.

If a defendant can intentionally or negligently fail to

deliver notice of an order to her opponent and secure a dismissal
of her adversary's case, what is to prevent abuse?

Under the

facts most favorable to Defendant, Woody Morton missed a deadline
by one day.

Justice should prevent the harsh result of

dismissing his case after years of diligent prosecution for the
want of one business day.

The lower court should be reversed and

this case should be remanded to be decided oni its merits.
DATED this

/

day of January, 199/5. ^

Denyer^C. Snufferj Jr.
27

;

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of
the foregoing Appellant's Brief was mailed, in accordance with
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, postage prepaid
to:

Mr. Terry Plant
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah.
&

DATED this \ £/

£^n
S:\denver\mort.app
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APPENDIX

Rule 4-501

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

892

Statement of the Rule:
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby designated as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar
City; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy;
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City.
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record of any
subject matter jurisdiction may hold court in any location designated by this
rule.
(Added effective January 1, 1992.)

ARTICLE 5.
CIVIL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims department of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the
memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all
3
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parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions
of the record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has
been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court.
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after
that date without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without
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court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment rewrote this rule to such an extent that a
detailed description is impracticable.
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of

the proposed order" following "supporting documentation" in Subdivision (1Kb) and made related stylistic changes and inserted "principal"
in Subdivision (3Kb).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
When rule aDnlies
wnen rme applies.
Uted
When rule applies.
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a
separate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff

should have been given ten days to respond, as
prescribed by Subdivision (1Kb) of this rule
Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct
App. 1991).
_. ,
_
TT
Cited m Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531
(Utah 1991); Lucero v. Warden of Utah State
Prison, 841 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1992»

Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases.
Intent:
To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery documents.
To establish a limitation on discovery procedures within 30 days of trial.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District, Juvenile and Circuit Courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 34 and 36 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure shall not file discovery requests with the clerk of the
court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the
discovery requests have been served on the other parties and the date of
service. The responding party shall file a similar certificate with the clerk of
the court.
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall retain the original with a
copy of the proof of service affixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery
request and proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel. The party
responding to the discovery request shall retain the original with a copy of the
proof of service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses and the proof of
service upon the opposing party or counsel. The discovery requests and response shall not be filed with the clerk of the court unless the court on motion
and notice and for good cause shown so orders.
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance with a discovery request
or a motion which relies upon the discovery response shall attach a copy of the
discovery request or response which is at issue in the motion.
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure shall not be
filed with the clerk of the court except as provided in this Code or upon order
of the court for good cause shown.
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovery proceedings in accordance with this rule. All discovery proceedings shall be completed, including
all responses thereto, and all depositions and other documents filed with the
court no later than thirty (30) days before the date set for trial of the case. The
right to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30) days before trial
shall be within the discretion of the court. Motions to conduct discovery within
thirty (30^ days before trial shall be presented to the judge assigned to the
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